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Know it while you have it: The ontological condition of a cancelled 
advertisement 
 
In 2011, Levis intoned the words of Bukoǁski͛s poem ͚The LaughiŶg Heaƌt͛ in its Weiden + 
Kennedy produced advertisement entitled ͚LegaĐǇ – Noǁ is ouƌ Tiŵe͛, as paƌt of their global 
͚Go Foƌth͛ campaign.1 A creative director declared the guiding spirit behind the campaign: 
It͛s tiŵe to iŶspiƌe aŶd aĐtiǀate a ǇouŶg, pƌogƌessiǀe Đultuƌe to ŵake a diffeƌeŶĐe, to 
be heard, to have a voice […] and time to not only bring them a message that 
matters but allow them to participate in a process of re-imagining.2 
Accordingly the advertisement includes a ƌeĐital of Bukoǁski͛s poeŵ ;Bukoǁski is 
posthumously Đƌedited as the ͚Wƌiteƌ͛ of the adǀeƌtiseŵent3) as the background soundtrack 
that accompanies images of youthful rebellion and non-conformity. We observe skinny 
youths in tight jeans and underwear as they engage in sexual abandonment, have 
transcendent experiences in nature, unrestrainedly dance at a rock concert, play with fire, 
and, as though it were a seamless and logical continuation within this sequence of imagery, 
we see them in the streets of Berlin, marching behind a red flag, unflinchingly facing down 
heavy armoured riot police and beckoning the primed cops to do their worst. ͚Go forth,͛ the 
advertisement proclaims. 
This act of appropriation need hardly surprise us. In the dialectical relationship between 
consumer culture and symbolic subversion, value is often identified for corporate 
                                                          
1 Levi’s Legacy®, 2011 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xn1V9v-v5us&feature=youtube_gdata_player> 
[accessed 20 April 2015]. Charles Bukowski, Betting on the Muse: Poems & Stories (Santa Rosa, Calif.: Black 
Sparrow Press, 1996), p. 400. 
2 Razorfish Case Study oŶ Levi’s Go Forth CaŵpaigŶ <https://vimeo.com/16602435> [accessed 20 April 2015]. 
3 ͚Leǀi͛s Go Foƌth ǁith LegaĐǇ͛, The Inspiration Room <http://theinspirationroom.com/daily/2011/levis-go-
forth-with-legacy/> [accessed 20 April 2015]. 
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extraction. Consumer culture, therefore, may be thought of as a cat and mouse game as 
advertisers seek to encode discourses of truth, subjectivity, freedom and authenticity, whilst 
the discourses themselves struggle to exist outside of consumerism so as to maintain 
relevance and affect. These moments of direct betrayal, however, are not what interest us 
here. What does is what happened next, which we believe to be a historically situated and 
saturated moment. As a writer foƌ Foƌďes ŵagaziŶe theŶ put it, ͚as London burns and 
violence creeps north into Manchester and Birmingham, Levis launch of an advertising 
campaign that features images of rebellious youth clashing with police in riot gear comes at 
a ďad tiŵe.͛4 The British television advertising campaign was cancelled because its launch 
date, October 2011, coincided with a national contagion of urban rioting, and suddenly the 
depictions in the advert could have been construed as a reckless incitement. 
The Ontological Condition of the Image 
You might react to the appƌopƌiatioŶ of Bukoǁski͛s poeŵ and imagery of leftist protest for 
the purpose of a lifestyle advertisement with a kind of disbelieving outrage. We think there 
is something much deeper going on here and wish to contrast this hermeneutical suspicion 
with an ontological depth. It is all too easy, we suggest (though not at all an error) to see 
only an appropriation of image for the sake of exchange value. We want to argue that this 
appropriation has its own ontological condition, and this makes the image far more complex 
than merely a cynical advertising campaign in which the makers of the advert have, yet 
again, stolen and debased counter-culture to sell their wares. We read the advertisement in 
terms of its ontological condition and suggest that the image was withdrawn in more 
complex circumstances than conventionally understood; more complex than the 
                                                          
4 ͚Leǀi͛s Latest ͞Go Foƌth͟ Ad ‘oŵaŶtiĐizes Youth ‘iots At The WƌoŶg Tiŵe͛, Forbes 
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewnewton/2011/08/10/levis-latest-go-forth-ad-romanticizes-youth-
riots-at-the-wrong-time/> [accessed 20 April 2015]. 
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embarrassment of being seen to valorise rioting during actual riots, and the sudden 
exposure of their vacuous nihilism. 
This article, then, develops an ontological interpretation of corporate appropriation of 
counter-culture that draws upon Benjamin͛s theoƌǇ of the phaŶtasŵagoƌia aŶd reflects 
upon the meaning of practices in the age of human capital. We bring the attendant insights 
to bear in a re-reading of Freud͛s essaǇ oŶ the uŶĐaŶŶǇ, this tiŵe eŵphasisiŶg the essaǇ͛s 
temporal doubles which help us to understand the adǀeƌtiseŵeŶt͛s liminality as a deliberate 
rendering of our post-consumerist future, intending to steal from us a future where, as 
Bukoǁski put it, ͚the gods ǁait to delight͛. In this moment of rendering and foreclosure, we 
argue that a more radical uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of the oŶtologiĐal depth of adǀeƌtisiŶg͛s iŵageƌǇ is 
possible. As stated, it is too easy to interpret the Levis advert as a sell-out of Bukoǁski͛s 
poem and the advert as a vacuous and cynical plaudit of revolution. What is more difficult is 
to experience Levis advertisement as messianic in the way Benjamin intends. We do not 
wish to say that the makers of this advert (still less those who commissioned it) intended it 
subversively to be messianic (otherwise it would be difficult to comprehend why they would 
have cancelled it), rather we want to interpret and reawaken these lost possibilities that are 
the condition for the power and affect of the image itself, and which the advertisers sought 
to hijack before history caught up with them. Because history did catch up and overtake the 
advertisement, a different analysis is possible. 
BeŶjaŵiŶ͛s PhaŶtasŵagoria aŶd the Messianic Promise. 
The oŶtologiĐal depth of the iŵage is at the heaƌt of BeŶjaŵiŶ͛s Arcade Project.5 He realised 
                                                          
5 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. by Rolf Tiedemann (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1999). 
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that what many took to be merely trivial aspects of daily existence (shopping, fashion and 
advertising) are at the heart of capitalism. What ǁas tƌue iŶ BeŶjaŵiŶ͛s tiŵe has Ŷoǁ 
become obvious for all. Who today does not know that these once thought of peripheral 
sectors of the economy are at the heart of accumulation? It is not in material production 
that we see the greatest degree of surplus value, but in immaterial production. Capital is 
increasingly virtual. Not just in financialisation, but also in consumption. It is the conjunction 
of signs and desire where the greatest profit is produced, not in the need for material 
things. Everything has become ephemeral and evanescent. All is signs and surface. 
However, it ǁould ďe a pƌofouŶd ŵisuŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of BeŶjaŵiŶ͛s pƌojeĐt to thiŶk it is 
puritanical and negative, as though in pointing out the vacuousness at the heart of 
modernity, one might return to an age when everything was solid and permanent. At the 
heart of the phantasmagoria, as Benjamin calls it, however weak and obscure, there are 
visible still burning embers of utopian possibilities of a different history that did not happen. 
The materialist historian blows on these cinders of a lost permanent past so that they throw 
a faint light onto another future within the contradictions and tensions of our present 
where we are told there is no alternative. 
As previously stated, our desire is to interpret the text as messianic, that is to avoid 
rehearsing the well told narrative of how capitalism recuperates its dissent (as argued in, for 
example, Boltanski and Ciapello͛s New Spirit of Capitalism6). Instead we want to interpret 
and then reawaken these lost possibilities that are the condition for the power and affect of 
the image itself. We want to do this because the dialectical image, Benjamin argues, 
                                                          
6 Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism, trans. by Gregory Elliott (London; New York: 
Verso, 2005). 
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contains within itself the repressed collective imagination in a crystalline form, and this is 
what we wish to access. We want to read the advert as a dialectical image that contains a 
yearning for another future; albeit a future that in the very moment of its consumption, is 
rendered impossible. This is why interpreting the image is the same as interpreting the 
dream. What is asleep in the image has to be awakened by the dialectical materialist. What 
is repressed can be brought to light and the depths made visible. 
All advertising that is jacked onto the unconscious collective imagination is messianic in this 
sense. From the side of the production of the image, and for the sophisticated and 
hermeneutical consumer, this only appears as a contemptible theft, but the dialectical 
materialist knows that without the messianic, the image would not exist at all. The 
advertisement feeds from the very energy and power of imagination it needs to repress, in 
order to create excessive surplus value. This ontological condition of the advert is made 
invisible in the very production of the image, and this is, we will explain, because of the 
peculiar historical moment of the context of its production. 
Advertising and Branding 
The figure of advertising within capitalism remains enigmatic. At its most basic, advertising 
informs and persuades consumers, but it is obvious that it does much more besides. 
Advertising also bellows desire and dislodges consumers from rational decision-making and 
summons them towards consuming within an ethic of imagination and fantasy. Along the 
way, advertising encodes and disseminates ideologies relating to gender, class, racial, and 
consumerist subjectivity. Hence car advertisements allure and coax prospective consumers 
via enchanting representations of lifestyle and sexuality, rather than linger over detailed 
technical specification. More recently, advertising tends to be located within a wider nexus 
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in which the brand is emphasised as the central component that subjectifies the consumer 
into a constellation of affect. To buy an Apple device, for example, is to purchase into a 
regime of meaning and practice that extends much further than consuming a mere gadget. 
It reaches into the self and into social relations. It is the power of the brand that allows us to 
understand the movement of Apple well beyond consumers using personal computers, into 
a whole way of life populated by a seemingly unlimited range of Apple products, services, 
and applications. The brand is not only consumed. The brand shapes and determines the 
consumer, both actively, in that the consumer sees themselves in the brand, and also 
passively, in that services, which is what most of the successful brands have become, 
increasingly collect masses of data on consumers so that they cannot only predict, but also 
cause future behaviour. In the brand, the individual is the commodity. The use value of the 
product is reset by advertising within a wider network of lifestyle related practices, and the 
subject-object distinction between consumers and the items being consumed dissolves.7 
Caƌl “agaŶ oŶĐe faŵouslǇ said, ͚if Ǉou ǁish to ďake an apple pie from scratch, you must first 
iŶǀeŶt the uŶiǀeƌse͛8, aŶd this ĐaŶ Ŷoǁ ďe ƌefoƌŵulated as: ͚if Ǉou ǁish to sell a pie, Ǉou 
ŵust fiƌst iŶǀeŶt the peƌsoŶ as a ĐoŶsuŵeƌ aŶd aŶiŵate the ǁoƌld theǇ iŶhaďit.͛ 
To say that advertising is conservative, in that it deepens consumption, is true, but to do 
that it has to populate and parasitise the subversive and insurrectionary. It scans the horizon 
of popular culture, looking for the new forms of value that can be ushered into being and be 
exploited. At one level this gives rise to the pƌofessioŶ of ͚ĐoolhuŶtiŶg͛: advertisers who seek 
                                                          
7 Detlev Zwick and Julien Cayla, Inside Marketing: Practices, Ideologies, Devices (Oxford [England]; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011). 
8 For the Sagan quote, see Carl Sagan Crumbly But Good, 2011 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9ssV79Qi7mM&feature=youtube_gdata_player> [accessed 21 April 
2015]. 
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out the latest indie music or set of imagery not yet tainted by commercial appropriation. At 
a deeper level, advertisers become readers of ideology, scanning not just the cultural, but 
also the political landscape for underlying anxieties within the national consciousness. As 
Douglas Holt put it in his influential book How Brands Become Icons, ͚iconic brands provide 
extraordinary identity value because they address the collective anxieties and desires of a 
nation͛9, hence brands are understood to contain mythical qualities, equivalent to the 
cultural resonance once enjoyed by Horatio Alger novels or John Wayne westerns. Holt gives 
the eǆaŵple of Budǁeiseƌ͛s ĐaŵpaigŶs duƌiŶg the ϭϵϴϬs that folloǁed ‘eagaŶ͛s failed 
promises to reinvigorate American masculinity in the spirit of frontier mythologies. Reagan 
only presided over further emasculation by rendering a large range of traditionally 
masculine professions in manufacturing obsolete. Responsively, Budweiser developed a 
campaign that included imagery of blue jeans, baseballs, young men in military uniforms, 
car mechanics sparring, attractive women with blonde hair, running Clydesdales and this 
͚targeted this acute tension between the revived American ideals of manhood and the 
economic realities that made these ideals neaƌlǇ uŶattaiŶaďle foƌ ŵaŶǇ ŵeŶ͛.10 Accordingly, 
in Holt͛s aŶalǇsis of ǁhat he teƌŵs ͚Đultuƌal ďƌaŶdiŶg͛, the brands are not merely parasitic 
but also directly productive of the social fabric, making interventions into ongoing political 
impasses and, if all goes well, therapeutically redressing ideological anomalies. In this 
regard, we might consider brands as active agents for the status quo. Hence for Leǀis͛ 
Legacy advert, which literally depicts youth playing with fire, the sudden overtaking by 
history transposed the advertisement from being an agent of containment to becoming 
dangerously close to an agent of aggravation, reminding us of the fine line that advertisers 
                                                          
9 Douglas B Holt, How Brands Become Icons: The Principles of Cultural Branding (Boston, Mass.: Harvard 
Business School Press, 2004), p. 6. 
10 Holt, pp. 6–7. 
8 
 
ride. It is tempting to even feel sorry for the advertisers as they became trapped into a 
double-bind: they too resonantly tapped into the zeitgeist, it was all too perfectly timed and 
consequentially they over-identified with the disaffection. 11 The simultaneous eruption of 
actually rioting in North London brought about a collision of the real and the symbolic that 
Đaused Holt͛s Đultuƌal ďƌaŶdiŶg ŵodel to short-circuit and left Levis with an expensive 
problem. Just like the characters depicted in the advert, Levis had been playing with fire. 
Therefore any reading that reduces advertising content to the strictly reactionary only ever 
sees one side of the image. At the very moment it betrays the future, it leaves a trace of a 
utopia in the repetition of an imaginary past that did not happen. All images of this kind 
induce us to dream of a classless society without exploitation. If the dialectical image were 
only cynical, as the clever hermeneutist believes, then it would not work. If the Levis advert 
or the Apple brand did not contain the dream or wish fulfilment of an alternative future 
asleep in the present, then they would not have the affective force or attraction they do. It 
is a profound misunderstanding of the power of the dialectical image only to interpret it 
negatively. They are ciphers of subjective desire and in this way contain, in a concentrated 
way, figures of another life. 
                                                          
11 It is worth mentioning that the British campaign had a corresponding formula in the US. Instead of using 
Bukowski, Walt Whitman was preferred as he poetically summoned youth to insurrection (see, Levi’s - 
OPioneers! (Go Forth) Commercial, 2009 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HG8tqEUTlvs&feature=youtube_gdata_player> [accessed 21 April 
2015]. ). Interestingly, the campaign sought to valorise the experience of the declining American blue collar 
laďouƌ ŵoǀeŵeŶt aŶd lead ǁith the slogaŶ ͚We aƌe all ǁoƌkeƌs͛ ;see, ͚Adeeǀee - Leǀi͛s: We Aƌe All Woƌkeƌs, 
There Is Work to Be Done and Undone, Hoƌse, EǀeƌǇďodǇ͛s Woƌk Is EƋuallǇ IŵpoƌtaŶt͛ 
<http://www.adeevee.com/2010/01/levis-we-are-all-workers-there-is-work-to-be-done-and-undone-horse-
everybodys-work-is-equally-important-outdoor/> [accessed 21 April 2015].) and did so contemporaneously to 
the OĐĐupǇ Wall “tƌeet ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛s slogaŶ ͞We aƌe the ϵϵ%͟. The ĐoiŶĐideŶĐe ǁas also pƌeseŶt iŶ theiƌ slogaŶ 
͞EǀeƌǇďodǇ͛s ǁoƌk is eƋuallǇ iŵpoƌtaŶt͟ ;see, DuŶĐaŶ MaĐleod, ͚Leǀis ‘eadǇ to Woƌk͛, The Inspiration Room 
<http://theinspirationroom.com/daily/2011/levis-ready-to-work/> [accessed 21 April 2015].). It is noteworthy 
that, as part of the campaign, a series of short documentaries depicting the hardship of post-industrial 
Braddock were produced (see, Levi’s We Are All Workers - Ep. 1 <https://vimeo.com/19226450> [accessed 21 
April 2015].) Of course, the irony of Levis contrived identification with the inhabitants of a depressed post-
industrial town is apparent when it is remembered that Levis outsource their production.  
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Capitalism and Subjectivity 
Marx famously describes capitalism in the Communist Manifesto as the destruction of every 
social order that has ever existed.12 Nothing can stand in its way or remain the same. Just as 
capitalism can wreck the external world, so too can it maim the relation of the self to itself. 
It is as though having reached the limits of geographical space, first through colonisation, 
and then globalisation, it now turns inwards. The fundamental concept to understand this 
change in direction, as Foucault recognised in his lecture on biopolitics, is human capital.13 
For classical economics (including Marx), human capital would be an oxymoron. Capital 
produces wealth by exploiting the capacities of human beings. Human beings and capital are 
fundamentally opposed to one another and politics is nothing less than the expression of 
this opposition. On the one hand, capital, on the other, labour. For this new economics, 
ǁhiĐh Đoŵes uŶdeƌ the laďel ͚Ŷeo-liďeƌalisŵ͛, ďut has its souƌĐe iŶ Oƌdoliďeƌalisŵ aŶd the 
Chicago school, the opposite is the case. Human capital is a tautology. Rather than human 
beings and capital being opposed to one another, they are to be viewed as the same. This 
means that relations that were seen as being outside of capital, like the family, education 
and health, could now be viewed as internal to capital. Human capital is a heterogeneous as 
opposed to a homogeneous concept of capital. Capital contains what is other to itself. All 
aspects of life are to be found within the flows of capital and there is nothing that cannot, or 
should not, be capitalised. 
The subjective correlate of this objective financialisation of life, and indeed of everything, is 
                                                          
12 ͚All that is solid ŵelts iŶto the aiƌ, all that is holǇ is pƌofaŶed, aŶd ŵaŶ is at last Đoŵpelled to face with sober 
seŶses, his ƌeal ĐoŶditioŶs of life, aŶd his ƌelatioŶs ǁith his kiŶd.͛ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The 
Communist manifesto (London; New York: Penguin Books, 2002), p. 223. 
13 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics : Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-79, trans. by Michel 
Senellart (Basingstoke [England]; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 216–38. 
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that the iŶdiǀidual iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ sees theŵselǀes iŶ the iŵage of Đapital. To ƌeaĐh oŶe͛s 
potential as a human being means to invest in oneself as capital. We are all to become 
entrepreneurs of the self. We are not to feel ourselves opposed to capital, but as part of the 
very process of its accumulation. This is a fundamental and decisive historical shift. Whereas 
classical economists would have explained work as objective exploitation of the worker 
(whether negatively or positively), economists like Schultz, Becker and Mincer, describe 
salaried work as subjective fulfilment.14 The object of economic analysis becomes, then, not 
the impersonal and anonymous processes that somehow trap and alienate individuals 
despite themselves, but an essentialised understanding of human behaviour. There is not, 
on the one side, the worker with their labour power, and on the other, the capitalist 
exploiting that labour power, but the individual who acts itself as a capitalist, and relates to 
itself as an investment (through education, health, and other kinds of self-development). 
We are all capitalists now. Capital does not stand outside of us like an external force, 
pushing us around like chess pieces on a board. Capital is your own activity as an 
entrepreneur of the self. Improve yourself so you can earn more. See yourself as a potential 
investment and your salary as promised future actual revenue. The cost of higher education, 
for example, is fees and loss of income, but I hope to offset this cost against the promise of 
a higher salary in the future.15 How is this different, in terms of its mechanism, from any 
other investment in capital? If you do not invest in yourself in this way, then you are lost. 
                                                          
14 See, Theodore W Schultz, IŶvestŵeŶt iŶ HuŵaŶ Capital : The Role of EducatioŶ aŶd of Research (New York: 
Free Press, 1970). Gary S Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference 
to Education, Ϯd ed ;Neǁ Yoƌk: NatioŶal Buƌeau of EĐoŶoŵiĐ ‘eseaƌĐh : distƌiďuted ďǇ Coluŵďia UŶiǀeƌsitǇ 
Press, 1975). Jacob Mincer, Schooling, Experience, and Earnings. (New York: National Bureau of Economic 
Research; distributed by Columbia University Press, 1974). 
15 This was the justification of the introduction of tuition fees in the UK and their tripling in England in 2010. 
See, ͚The BƌoǁŶe ‘epoƌt: Higheƌ EduĐatioŶ FuŶdiŶg aŶd “tudeŶt FiŶaŶĐe - Publications - GOV.UK͛ 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-browne-report-higher-education-funding-and-student-
finance> [accessed 22 April 2015].  
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You are outside the revenue-flux of capital and are destined to a life of precarious and 
disposable employment. 
If there is no outside to capital, if every human being is only a revenue-flux, then what 
consequence does this have for politics? As Tronti already pointed out in 1966, in Workers 
and Capital, the aim of capital is to unify the interests of the worker with itself.16 If they see 
themselves in the image of capital, then the great political struggles of modernity will come 
to an end. It is not the collapse of the Soviet Union, and all that this event contained, that 
lead to the triumph of capitalism. This is to confuse a symptom with its cause. It is because 
the workers increasingly saw themselves as entrepreneurs rewarded by differential salaries 
that sounded the death knell to the traditional left. The worker did not fear exploitation; 
they wanted to be exploited, or rather they wanted to become the objects of their own self-
exploitation, because not to be exploited by capital was not to be able to plug oneself into 
the revenue-flux, but instead to be left on the scrap heap of life. 
Before we succumb to a counsel of despair, it is important to emphasise that this 
appropriation of the worker by capital is always ideological. What capital promises is not 
what is true, even though its untruth structures social reality. It is not enough that an 
ideology simply lies, or no one would believe it, and to accuse everyone of a universal 
stupidity except oneself is an egotistical weakness every critic should avoid. Ideology must 
produce a reality. Ideology is not a representation of an existing state of affairs where one 
ĐaŶ poiŶt out the diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ oŶe aŶd the otheƌ; a ͚ďad͛ in opposition to a ͚good͛ 
representation. Ideologies sustain and create realities. Without them, reality would not exist 
                                                          
16 Mario Tronti, Operai E Capitale. (Torino: Einaudi, 1966). 
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as such. The anomalies lie not between ideology and reality, but internally within the 
ideology, in the gaps and inconsistencies of its own narrative. This is why ideologies collapse 
when they no longer make sense, not because they cease to agree with a supra-reality that 
exists outside of them. Otherwise it would be impossible to explain why people continue to 
believe even when the facts (reality) so manifestly tell them otherwise (that for example 
student debt leads to fulfilling and well-paid work). Ideologies work because they structure 
reality so that the anomalies are not experienced as anomalies. They are either ignored or 
said to be problems we can solve in the future. It is the task of the dialectical materialist to 
focus on these anomalies so as to demonstrate that there are inconsistencies within an 
ideology that mask its own incompleteness. 
The high water mark of ideological mystification is when an ideology presents itself as non-
ideological, as though there were no difference between reality and discourse, and history 
itself were but a fiction. These two moments always arrive together. An ideology claims that 
it is the only true account of reality (in this way it believes itself to be a science), and that all 
other ideologies are therefore false. Because it claims to be the only true representation of 
reality, it also claims that all history (the history of false ideologies) has come to an end. The 
ǁatĐhǁoƌd of aŶ ideologǇ is alǁaǇs ͚theƌe is Ŷo alteƌŶatiǀe͛. The ĐƌitiƋue of ideologǇ is Ŷot a 
falling back into relativism (everything is ideology), which is merely the opposite side of the 
coin of an absolute claim to truth (it is only because we do not believe in absolute truth 
anymore that we become relativists, such that Nietzsche can claim that nihilism is the last 
form of Christianity). The critique of ideology is, on the contrary, the commitment to 
historical reality (the reality of change and becoming), which always produces anomalies 
within any ideological structure, and which it covers over through its own deviations, 
13 
 
inconsistencies and incoherence. 
Ideology and Practice 
Reality everywhere and always overflows any ideology, but it always does so in a specific 
historical form. The idea of a transcendent ahistorical, objective reality is itself ideological. 
Reality is dated. Rather than thinking that the meaning of reality is obvious, the opposite is 
the case. Meaning is rare, and there are always other possibilities. Nothing has to be as it is, 
though it always appears as it is. What history shows us, is how reality as conceived at any 
given time could have been different, and is certainly different from the way we conceive it 
at the time. The point is to make sense of that change, however rare and exceptional it is. 
We think, or at least those of us with a philosophical bent do, that first of all people have an 
idea and then they change reality to fit those ideas. So for example, someone has the idea 
of being a prince (perhaps they have read Machiavelli) and then they decide to govern that 
way. People then study these ideas in universities and imagine this is how history itself 
changes. It is not ideas that are first but practices, and the latter are not simply disguised 
ideas, which conceal a hidden essence. 
A practice is a subjective human activity pure and simple. If a practice is a human activity, 
then it is first of all a verb rather than a noun. If power is a relation between the governed 
and the governors, then what determines these objects are the practices of governing. 
History is the history of activities, of verbs, and only subsequently of objects, nouns. We like 
nouns because they are stable and do not change. A rock is a rock, is it not? Nature never 
changes, but practices change all the time.17 Is there any limit to human practices? Is not 
                                                          
17 This opposition between nature and history is a false one. What is real are practices (and this includes the 
sciences). Natural objects are the result of practices. There is no hidden reality that transcends them and 
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this what anthropology and history tell us, namely that human beings are infinitely 
imaginative when it comes to the practice of political power? Why do we imagine such 
change should come to an end now suddenly and the way we live permanent? It is because 
practices come first, and history is nothing but the history of practices, that ideologies can 
never amount to a total explanation. It is not objectifications like Justice or the State or the 
Market that explain a practice; rather it is a particular historically dated practice that 
explains these objectifications. Any such practice is never completely reducible to a visible 
form, which explains why knowledge and power are never one and the same, even though 
knowledge is always attracted to power, and attempts to capture and stratify it.  
It is therefore a profound misunderstanding of Marx to think that he too is giving a trans-
historical explanation of history. This is to confuse Marx with Marxism, the latter being a 
variant of Hegelianism.18 Marx begins with practices. This is his critique of ideology. To 
criticise ideology is not, as Althusser believed, to discover some truth or structure that is 
concealed by the ideology and which can be described scientifically. On the contrary, it is to 
make the ontological claim that what is real are practices and any objectification is 
subsequent to these. It is not the job of the dialectical historian to offer yet one more 
objectification as an explanation of history (Class, Production, Workers, Capital, and so on), 
but to describe these practices, which are the result of what people say and do. History 
consists of heterogeneous practices, rare and unexpected, and not of homogeneous forces 
mysteriously determining practices from the outside. There is not first of all the State or 
Power, which then take on multiple versions throughout history (as though a hidden 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
remains the same outside of history. 
18 For a sustained critique of the Marxist appropriation of Marx and the centrality of praxis in his thought, see, 
Michel Henry, Marx (Paris: Gallimard, 1976). Only the first volume has been translated as, Michel Henry, Marx: 
A Philosophy of Human Reality (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983). 
15 
 
essence had fallen into time). Rather there are only multiple versions of the state or power, 
which are objectifications of different practices, each one different from the other. The 
multiple precedes any unity and creates it as an ideological mystification of its own 
singularity. Each practice views history from its own standpoint and comes to believe that all 
history begins and ends with it. It does not see the emptiness surrounding its exceptionality, 
that reality could have been otherwise, and that there are others ways of doing and 
speaking. Any such universality comes after a practice rather than preceding it. 
This is ǁhǇ BeŶjaŵiŶ speaks of the histoƌǇ of the ͚Ŷoǁ poiŶt͛, oƌ the ͚dialeĐtiĐs of the 
staŶdstill͛, ďeĐause he ǁoƌƌies that the dialeĐtiĐal ŵateƌialists haǀe falleŶ pƌeǇ to the saŵe 
abstractions as their enemies, who also view history through the veil of progress towards 
some ultimate end, where all contradiction and difference would vanish.19 The historical 
perception sees the past moment reaching a higher level of actualisation than it did in its 
own reality. This higher actuality is the image: the past repeated, but as though it came from 
the future. It is the reactivation of the past that puts the present to the test (apocatastasis). 
This is the difference between the dialectical historian and the historiographer. The latter 
sees history as a straight line. He sees one thing happening after the other, where historical 
change is the repetition of the same (different forms of the same natural objects), whereas 
the dialectical historian sees history as a series of heterogeneous practices, in which a 
different future already announces itself in the failed actualisations (anomalies) of the past. 
This is why the dialectical historian, like Benjamin, is fascinated by fragments, pieces, images 
and absurdities, rather than by the grand history of princes and kings, or by relations of 
production that serenely progress to some ultimate end. The founding concept of dialectical 
                                                          
19 Benjamin, p. 261. 
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histoƌǇ, he ǁƌites, ͚is Ŷot pƌogƌess ďut aĐtualisatioŶ͛.20 Surrounding every practice, there is a 
void of the potential. From within any given practice, this void is invisible. To render these 
possibilities invisible is the function of ideology, which does not determine the practices but 
follows from them. Within any practice, however, (otherwise there would be no change), 
there are anomalies, non-actualised potentialities asleep in a dream or an image. This is the 
origin, however weak and momentary, of their force to affect and unsettle us. BenjamiŶ͛s 
thesis is that in our epoch – the era of the commodity, where exchange value has replaced 
use value, and the individual themselves have become a commodity and the spectacle is as 
important, if not more so, than the object sold – we might find this future moment torn out 
of the continuum of history, in the less likely of places: fashion, shopping centres and 
advertising. And why not, since this is where desire is to be found? 
The image of capital has its source in the real capacities and abilities of individuals. It is 
always and everywhere the partial actualisation of possibilities. It is the ruinous relation of 
the self to itself, from and to the world. Ruinous, because it reverses the real relation 
between capital and life by presenting capital as the mysterious origin of life, such that we 
must destroy life to preserve capital, and not capital to save life, as life would not be 
possible without it, rather than capital without life. The contradiction at the heart of capital 
is the total objectification of life in capital, whose limit condition is death, but it requires the 
subjectivity of life to produce surplus value, for without the intelligence, creativity and 
passion of individuals it would produce nothing at all. To conceal this contradiction, the 
ideology of capital has to force the individual to see their subjectivity as nothing but the 
objectivity of capital. Nonetheless, however smoothly this representation imagines it works, 
                                                          
20 Benjamin, p. 260. 
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historical reality, which is made up of real practices or real people, exceeds it from all sides. 
Critique, critique of ideology, is the counter movement: to show the real hidden in the 
image, to reveal the hidden mechanism of the image, and to reverse the ͚miraculation͛ of 
capital that presents itself as the origin of the life it destroys. 
If the image did not betray itself, then the ideology of ideology would remain invisible. What 
the image hides is the impossibility of a future, because of the commodification of the 
individual, but the affective force of the image is as though that future were real, that 
people really did live lives of intensity, protest and passion, and not lives of opportunism, 
cynicism and anxiety, so they can afford to buy Levis. When the image comes into contact 
with the real, real riots rather than fake ones, then the ideological contradiction becomes 
too visible. It was right to cancel the advert, not because it would have incited more riots 
(there is no evidence that the rioters were watching the Levis advert), but because its 
absurdity would become too obvious. 
Freud: the Uncanny and the Double 
This is the sensible hermeneutical reading of the situation, and we would not want to 
dismiss it out of hand. But what if the opposite were true, that the advert presented, 
despite itself, the real revolutionary moment? This is the paradox of a betrayal. It has to 
present what it betrays. In this sense, betrayal is a kind of a respect and recognition, even if 
it is one that is repressed and distorted. This repression requires a deeper ontological 
analysis than the hermeneutical outrage, and this analysis, as we have already glimpsed 
with Benjamin, is essentially temporal. Heƌe ǁe ǁaŶt to use Fƌeud͛s aŶalǇsis of the uŶĐaŶŶǇ, 
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though what we will have to say about time will, to some extent, differ from his.21 
The suďǀeƌsioŶ at the heaƌt of the adǀeƌt͛s iŵage is the futuƌe. IŶ oŶe seŶse, this futuƌe is 
banal. The commodity will fulfil a need. This is the simplest form of advertising. Even this 
mundane image, however, can become more complex. The image does not just signify a use 
value, but something more nebulous and indistinct, like a lifestyle or authenticity. Now that 
every house has a washing machine, at least in the more developed economies, the latter 
form of advertising has replaced the former. The purchase of jeans is no longer the 
satisfaction of a need (hard wearing durable work clothes), but an expression of oŶe͛s 
values and principles. It is in these more allegorical images that we discover another kind of 
future, however distorted and weak it might be. Of course it would be absurd to say this 
other future is what the image itself promises, as though the advert were promoting 
revolution, when entirely the opposite is the case. Its affective force is parasitical rather 
than assertive. It captures joyful passions to transform them into sad ones. It seizes and co-
opts vitality for the sake of consumption. This is obvious in the Levis advert, because it 
consists of a quotation of the Bukowski poem, which itself could not be more opposed to its 
own values, but even the aura of this poem only has a resonance in this image, because it is 
linked to a revolutionary moment (a revolution that never happens and which is arrested in 
the image itself). Nonetheless the virtual revolution is and has always been. If it were not, 
then the image would have no power. It would be flat and monotonous and produce no 
emotion in the viewer. The image shows us what has not happened, and betrays this 
happening in both form and content, but it only works, because the possibility of happening 
                                                          
21 “igŵuŶd Fƌeud, ͚The ͞UŶĐaŶŶǇ͛͟, iŶ Art aŶd Literature: JeŶseŶ’s Gradiva, LeoŶardo Da ViŶci aŶd Other 
Works, ed. by Albert Dickson, trans. by James Strachey (London: Penguin, 1985), pp. 335–76. Freud does 
mention in passing advertising in this piece, though only in relation to pillars in the street announcing spiritual 
mediums. Freud, p. 365. 
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of ǁhat has Ŷot happeŶed ;the ƌeǀolutioŶ to Đoŵe, ǁhat BeŶjaŵiŶ Đalls the ͚ǁish iŵage͛ of 
a ͚classless society͛) comes before every present actuality rather than after it.22 It is a 
permanent contestation of the ideology of the present. 
We are describing the image from the outside (from the position of the subject who knows), 
but in terms of the subject who sees this doubling up of the image, it is felt as uncanny and 
unsettling, because it presents the tension of the moment precisely by not presenting it. 
This abortive presentation has two sides: on the one hand, it is the presentation of the 
image itself, where the image attempts to present itself as what it is not, an advert. It 
professes to be a visual re-interpretation of the Bukowski poem, as though the selling of 
jeans were an after-thought (whereas in reality, obviously, it is the other way around). The 
viewer can experience this deceit in two ways. Either they can identify with the image and 
associate this brand of jeans with an outsider and alternative lifestyle (this was surely the 
intention of those who made the advert and those who bought it), or the hermeneutical 
subject can feel that this is just yet one more cynical example of advertising appropriating 
counter culture in order to sell commodities. There is a third possibility, however, that we 
are here arguing for, which is more difficult to grasp than even this double presentation of 
sincerity and cynicism, and that refers to the temporal structure of the image itself. On the 
one hand, there is the aesthetic or hermeneutical double of the image, its intention and 
subsequent interpretation, and on the other, the double of time. This does not mean that 
these ͚douďles͛ haǀe Ŷo ƌelatioŶ to oŶe aŶotheƌ. The affeĐtiǀe foƌĐe of the iŵage͛s ŵeaŶiŶg 
has its source in the temporal repetition, but to remain only at the level of semantics is to 
be lost iŶ the iŵage͛s oǁŶ distoƌtioŶ. The iŵage pƌoŵises to the degƌee that it lies. The 
                                                          
22 Benjamin, p. 4. 
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power of the advert has its source in a different historical reality, which it conceals by its 
aesthetic double. This is why it is not sufficient just to interpret the cynicism in the use of 
the image. The materialist historian has to show how the image contains, at its centre, a 
past that can only be redeemed in a future yet to happen. 
Fƌeud͛s essaǇ oŶ the uŶĐaŶŶǇ is full of douďles. This is the joǇ of ƌeadiŶg it. OŶe double 
tumbles after the other. There are doubles of fathers, of daughters and automatons, eyes 
aŶd peŶises, gettiŶg lost aŶd fiŶdiŶg oŶe͛s ǁaǇ ďaĐk iŶ the ǀeƌǇ plaĐe Ǉou sought to aǀoid. 
Some examples are from literature and fables, others from psychoanalysis and everyday life. 
Freud tells a wonderful, entertaining story, which you could imagine him retelling at some 
paƌtǇ oƌ get togetheƌ, of suddeŶlǇ fiŶdiŶg hiŵself iŶ the pƌostitute͛s Ƌuaƌteƌ of a ĐitǇ ǁhile 
walking on an Italian holiday.23 Wishing, perhaps to save himself from future 
embarrassment, to leave this area as soon as possible, he quickly turns around, but soon 
fiŶds hiŵself ƌight ďaĐk ǁheƌe he staƌted. Theƌe aƌe tǁo Fƌeud͛s. Theƌe is the Fƌeud of the 
grand theory and universal narrative, where every desire is immediately triangulated in the 
Oedipus complex, and there is the other Freud of jokes, stories and case studies, where the 
details, differences and idiosyncrasies continually overflow the theory that tries to imprison 
and corral them. The same is the case with his essaǇ oŶ the uŶĐaŶŶǇ. At the heaƌt of Fƌeud͛s 
interpretation of the uncanny lies his hypothesis of the return of the repressed. We 
experience a feeling of uncanniness, because some episode from the past returns to visit us 
in the present, as though the past had not yet done with us. The doubles of the uncanny all 
have their source in their original temporal doubling, but Freud thinks about this temporal 
structure in a specific way, which we will need to determine, because there are two pasts at 
                                                          
23 Freud, pp. 358–9. 
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opeƌatioŶ heƌe. Theƌe is a past that ďeloŶgs to the pƌeseŶt, the pƌeseŶt͛s past so to speak, 
and there is a past more ancient then any past, a pure past. Fƌeud͛s theoƌǇ of the ƌepƌessed 
favours the first past over the second, but it is the pure past that has a greater political 
significance and force.24 
How can there be two pasts we might wonder? Surely there is only the past of memory. I 
look through my photographs and remember the past as I once lived it. Yet such a memory 
is not the experience of the past as past, but of the past as present. I remember the past 
now as I look at the photographs sitting in this room. If the past were only a memory then 
there would be no past as such. There would only be present memories, which would be 
merely less intense experiences of the present. There is another past, more past than any 
past, which is not the past as present, but the past of the present; the passing of the present 
that belongs to every present, even every future one, such that I know that every memory is 
never quite what the past was. The past of memory belongs to the individual, to the self 
that remembers it. The past of the present, the passing of the present, is absolute. It is the 
past in which every moments passes, and without which there would be no past at all, no 
sense of the passing of time, and in this way, no possibility of memory either that snatches 
fragments out of it to reconstitute a self it can barely remember. 
                                                          
24 The phƌase ͚pure past͛ is Deleuze͛s and belongs to his critic of Freud in Difference and Repetition. See, Gilles 
Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 96–116. Our temporal 
ontology of the image, which is to be contrasted with its hermeneutic reading, is also iŶdeďted to Deleuze͛s 
Bergsonism (from which his critic of Freud begins). See, Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson 
and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1988), and Gilles Deleuze, Cinema II: The Time-Image, trans. 
ďǇ Hugh ToŵliŶsoŶ aŶd ‘oďeƌt Galeta, ‘epƌiŶt editioŶ ;LoŶdoŶ ; Neǁ Yoƌk: Blooŵsbury Academic, 2013), pp. 
103–30. Foƌ BeƌgsoŶ͛s oǁŶ aĐĐouŶt of the past, see H. Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. by Nancy Margaret 
Paul and W. Scott Palmer (New York: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 133–77. We also found Alia Al-“aji͛s article 
particular useful in explaining this ontology of time, Alia Al-“aji, ͚The MeŵoƌǇ of AŶotheƌ Past: BeƌgsoŶ, 
Deleuze and a New Theory of Tiŵe͛, Continental Philosophy Review, 37.2 (2004), 203–39. Finally, as 
McGettigaŶ poiŶts out, BeŶjaŵiŶ͛s oǁŶ ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of histoƌiĐal tiŵe ǁas iŶspiƌed ďǇ his ƌeadiŶg of BeƌgsoŶ. 
See, AŶdƌeǁ MĐGettigaŶ, ͚As Floǁeƌs TuƌŶ Toǁaƌds the “uŶ: Walteƌ BeŶjaŵiŶ͛s BeƌgsoŶiaŶ Iŵage of the Past͛, 
Radical Philosophy, 158 (2009), 25–35. 
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IŶ oŶe seŶse, Fƌeud͛s essaǇ ďoth ƌeĐogŶises aŶd fails to recognise this absolute past, the 
past of the past. It acknowledges it by locating the effect of time in unconscious processes. 
The past returns without me knowing it. I find myself on the same street without knowing 
how I got there. Yet Freud always pins this repetition down to an ancient past that functions 
like a memory. Either the uncanny is to be explained by the repetition of a past moment of 
the iŶdiǀidual͛s deǀelopŵeŶt that has ďeĐoŵe stuĐk ;ĐastƌatioŶ, foƌ eǆaŵple iŶ the Đase of 
HoffŵaŶŶ͛s The Sandman), or the return of a prehistorical stage of human civilisation (Freud 
explains the uncanny as a vestige of animism). By anchoring the pure past in an ancient one, 
Freud transforms what is virtual (the past as the possibility of the future thrown beyond my 
present as it actually is) into a permanent actuality that constrains the present (the past as 
the actuality of the present). Repetition becomes repetition of the same, a repeating of 
something that had happened again and again, whether the Oedipus complex or animism, 
rather than the repetition of difference, variation without origin. What returns does not 
haǀe to ƌetuƌŶ as the saŵe. WheŶ oŶe ƌeads Kafka͛s The Trial, for example, each reading 
produces a new version without returning to an original, and it is precisely this movement 
that is lost when one interprets it, as though it were just one more example of the Oedipus 
complex. It is as though, having opened up the PaŶdoƌa͛s Box of difference, with the 
proliferation of examples without origin, Freud quickly has to close it down by imposing a 
schema from above. They are, then, just the same incidents of the castration complex, or 
animism, repeating themselves. 
The paradox of time is that the future does not come after the past, but changes it. It selects 
from the past that which is repeated, but what is repeated is not the same. The festival 
comes after the event that bears its name, but it is the festival that gives force and 
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significance to the event, and not the event bestowing it on the festival. For who would 
have remembered the Bastille if it had not been repeated, but what is repeated is not the 
same. When we think of the past, we think of it as unchangeable. What has happened 
cannot be undone. This is to forget that anything that has happened had to come into 
existence and its coming into existence was never necessary. There is a difference between 
what has happened and the happening of what has happened. As Kierkegaard writes, we 
know the star that shines in the night sky, but the happening of the star, that it exists at all, 
is still a wonder to us.25 Each event is surrounded by an aura of possibility in two senses. 
Every actuality emerges from a field of multiple possibilities of what could have been, and in 
this actuality every other possibility is overcome but never eliminated. They remain in the 
absolute past always possible, ready to be selected differently and they announce another 
future that transforms the past completely (now everything has changed, now we must 
begin again). Towards the actual I am certain, towards the possible I am not. It is a matter of 
passion and belief. I say such and such has happened in the past, and in this moment the 
whole of the present and the future are transformed. I am certain of it. I commit my whole 
life to this moment, but I can only do so because I have faith in the happening of what has 
happened, its possibility that is held open into the future. 
We are offering two readings of the image. One is hermeneutical and the other ontological. 
The hermeneutical only sees the cynicism of the image. It understands that the image 
betrays the revolutionary possibilities contained in the original event. Advertising captures 
Bukoǁski͛s poeŵ aŶd uses it to sell commodities to a commodified subject. This is a story 
we all know. But the cynical reading only repeats the cynicism of the age, for the advertiser 
                                                          
25 Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton  N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 81. 
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is also fully conscious of this betrayal, and is no less knowing than the critic. Who is duping 
whom? It is important to get beneath this theatre of signs to the ontology of time, 
otherwise we will never be able to escape this circularity. There are two futures. There is the 
future of the present that is the repetition of the same. Actuality determines possibility and 
there is no alternative except the dark night of chaos. Yet there is also another future, 
perhaps more difficult to discern and see, but which is the future of the past, rather than of 
the present. A future open to possibilities in the past that were never actualised. It is 
BeŶjaŵiŶ͛s iŶsight to ƌeĐogŶise that the phaŶtasŵagoƌia of Đapitalisŵ is ďased upoŶ the 
force of the second future and the very same time that it presents in the language of the 
first. Capitalism lives in its aborted revolutions, just as it creates surplus from the living 
creativity of humanity, while trying to reduce it to a commodified form of a revenue-flux. 
This is not merely an ideological but an ontological error. It feeds from the very vitality it 
seeks to destroy, just as the Levis advert leeches the sentiment and force of the original 
Bukowski poem, while leaving everything the same, until its own contradictions are 
shattered against reality. 
͚There is Ŷo AlterŶative͛ 
Within the analysis of life under late capitalism, it is often said that we are in a post-political 
age. Of course this does not mean that politics cease, but rather the forums and possibilities 
of politics become severely limited and the political realm is reduced to the mechanic of 
implementing an ever increasingly intensified corporatised and financialised landscape that 
defeŶds aŶd legitiŵises itself thƌough aŶ appeal to ͚ĐoŵŵoŶ-seŶse͛ aŶd the iŵpossiďilitǇ of 
any alternative. It is within this post-political sphere that dissent appears impossible and the 
population is reduced to bystanders. 2011, the year in which Levis hoped to launch this 
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advertisement, was also the year of global eruptions of political opposition, from the Arab 
Spring to the global occupy movement and to the British riots. It was the actual assurance 
that such forms of protest, dissent and subversion, as depicted in the advert, were 
anachronistic, belonging to an ancient past, which lead to the depictions in a commercial in 
the first place. Nothing was going to change, so why not use an image of dissent and of a 
classless society to sell jeans? They believed that politics is over and only existed as a kind of 
symbolic capital that one could draw upon to reinforce and consolidate their brand. They 
only depicted rioting, because they could not have imagined that rioting would actually take 
place. They could only envision a future present, according to which everything will always 
be the same, and not a future past, the repetition of difference. 
This is the contradiction at the heart of the image. It must ride a line between the symbolic, 
on the one hand, which is open to hermeneutical cynicism, but attempts to resist it through 
an appeal to authentic subjectivity, and, on the other, the ontology of the real. It must be 
parasitic on the world of subversion, yet it must never valorise actual subversion; it can only 
fliƌt ǁith suďǀeƌsioŶ͛s sǇŵďoliĐ aspeĐt, Ŷeǀeƌ with any actual subversion. The uncanny is 
what happens when the images fail and expose their own mechanisms, but in so doing 
reveal the ontological depths on which their own inversion depends. This experience of the 
uncanny is not a cognitive or semantic one. It is affective and subjective. It does not require, 
like the heƌŵeŶeutiĐal ĐƌitiƋue, that oŶe is ͚Đleǀeƌ͛ eŶough to ƌead the iŵage. It is the 
generalised anxiety of capitalism that constantly attempts to capture the affective 
dimension of life, but fails to do so.  
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